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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT OF PRI-
VACY-WARRANTLESS AERIAL SEARCH-The United States Supreme
Court has held that a warrantless aerial search from an altitude of
400 feet of an individual's curtilage does not violate the Fourth
Amendment- right of privacy guarantee.
Florida v. Riley, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
Michael A. Riley (hereinafter Riley) maintained a greenhouse 10
to 20 feet behind a mobile home in which he lived.' The green-
house and mobile home, located on approximately five acres of ru-
ral property, which Riley rented, were surrounded by fencing and
were posted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign.2 The greenhouse was
covered on two sides, but the view into the greenhouse from the
two open sides was obstructed by trees, shrubs and the mobile
home.3 Approximately 90 percent of the roof of the greenhouse was
covered by translucent and opaque corrugated roofing panels, the
remaining 10 percent was uncovered.4
Deputy Sheriff Gell of the Pasco County Sheriff's office, re-
sponding to a tip that marijuana was being grown in the green-
house, located Riley's property, and attempted to view the green-
house contents from a road in front of the trailer.5 Unable to
determine what type of plants were being grown inside the green-
house from this vantage point, Deputy Gell arranged to fly over
1. Florida v. Riley, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 693, 695 (1989).
2. Id. Riley testified that he rented the property and was living at the residence at the
time of the incident. Riley also testified that he constructed the greenhouse behind the
trailer. Joint Appendix for Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), (No. 87-764).
3. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695.
4. Id.
5. Id. Testimony of Sheriff Gell indicated that he and Deputy Longworth located
Riley's property and positioned themselves at different places on the road in front of the
trailer. They did not attempt to see inside the greenhouse from areas adjacent to the prop-
erty that were not on the road. Joint Appendix for Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989),
(No. 87-764).
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the greenhouse with the Sheriff Department's helicopter pilot.'
From a flight height of approximately 400 feet, Deputy Gell was
able to see into the openings of the greenhouse roof, look into an
uncovered side of the greenhouse that was obscured from view
from the road, and determine, through plain eye view, that the
plants being grown were marijuana.7 With this information, a war-
rant was obtained and a subsequent search of the premises re-
vealed marijuana plants.8 Subsequently, Riley was charged with
unlawful possession of marijuana under Florida law.' Riley moved
to suppress the evidence"0 of the marijuana plants arguing that
under the Fourth Amendment 1 and Florida laws,' 2 he had an ac-
tual and reasonable expectation of privacy that was constitution-
ally protected.' 3 The State argued that since all aerial cases in the
past had been decided on the issue of whether aerial observations
were made from a lawful viewing point, the evidence should not be
suppressed since the police were at a legal aerial vantage point. 4
The trial court found that the defendant had an actual and reason-
able expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment and
granted the motion to suppress the evidence.'"
6. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695.
7. Id. Deputy Gell indicated that when the pilot first flew over the house, the helicop-
ter was at 400 feet. He did not know if the helicopter flew lower than this. Deputy Gell took
photos with a zoom lens but indicated he could see the greenhouse and its contents much
better than the camera's pictures depicted. Deputy Gell also testified that no binoculars
were used. Joint Appendix for Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), (No. 87-764).
8. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961), that evidence
seized in an illegal search was barred from being used in a state prosecution by application
of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Id. at 1694. Thus, if the visual search was illegal, evidence with respect to this visual
citing of marijuana would be excluded. This is known as the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment analysis.
11. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . ." Id.
12. FLA. CONST. art I, § 12. The Florida Constitution provides that it is a "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . ." Id.
13. Joint Appendix for Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), (No. 87-764). Riley ar-
gued that since an effort was made to conceal the marijuana from view by both the road and
the air, a reasonable expectation of privacy was shown. Id.
14. Id.
15. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695. The trial court reasoned that the defendant exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial viewings because the openings in the roof were
to allow sunlight. The trial court also distinguished this case from open field aerial viewing
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The Florida Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court relying on Randall v. State.16 In Randall, the court held that
the aerial viewing of a backyard by police did not constitute gov-
ernmental intrusion which rose to a level of an impermissible
search even though the defendant exhibited a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 17 The Riley court, however, noting that this was an
issue of great public importance, certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the question of whether a legal, 400 foot aerial observation
of a backyard, where an individual has exhibited a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, is permissible.1
8
The Florida Supreme Court, applying the two prong test of Katz
v. United States, 9 found that an actual expectation of privacy was
exhibited by Riley's fence and covering on the greenhouse and that
this expectation was reasonable, based on the reasoning that no
person should be forced to go to extraordinary steps to protect his
backyard from helicopter viewing at 500 feet. 0 The Florida Su-
preme Court applied and distinguished California v. Ciraolo,2' and
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,22 which held that fixed wing
aircraft flights within the legal airspace did not violate one's expec-
tation of privacy.2' The court opined that an aerial view from a
helicopter at 500 feet in the instant case was not comparable to the
cases. Joint Appendix for Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), (No. 87-764).
16. 458 So.2d 822 (1984). Defendant's backyard was obscured from view by a reed
fence. The police, acting on an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in the backyard,
subsequently were able to view the plants from a helicopter at a routine flying altitude. The
court reasoned that the police were where they were legally entitled to be; therefore, the
information obtained could be used as the basis for a warrant. 458 So. 2d at 823-826.
17. Id. at 825.
18. State v. Riley, 476 So.2d 1354 (1985). The Riley court noted that the Randall deci-
sion certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court but, as the parties did not pursue the
case, no holding was issued. 476 So.2d at 1356.
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the two prong test is best summarized by Harlan's
concurring opinion as first, an individual must exhibit an actual subjective, expectation of
privacy and second, that expectation must be recognized as reasonable by society. 389 U.S.
at 361.
20. Florida v. Riley, 511 So.2d 282 (1987).
21. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In Ciraolo, the police, responding to an anonymous tip, in-
spected defendant's property from an airplane at an altitude of 1,000 feet because the prop-
erty was obscured at ground level from a ten (10) foot fence. The Court held that the second
prong of the Katz test was not met as it was not reasonable for defendant to expect his
backyard to be free from observation from aircraft in legal airspace. The search did not,
therefore, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 209-15.
22. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). In Dow Chemical, the Court upheld the taking of aerial
photos at a minimum of 1,200 feet of an industrial plant. The Court reasoned that the area
of a plant is more analogous to an open field than to curtilage within the backyard and is,
therefore, open to viewing by persons in lawful air space. Id. at 238-39.
23. 511 So. 2d at 285 (citing Dow, 476 U.S. at.238-39).
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higher lawful aerial vantage point of at least 1,000 feet of the fixed
wing aircraft in those cases.24 The court thus held that the surveil-
lance constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and Arti-
cle 1, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.2 5 The court quashed
the decision of the Second District Court and remanded for rein-
statement of the trial court's suppression order.2" The United
States Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari
challenging the Florida Supreme Court's decision.
2 7
The plurality, stating that California v. Ciraolo was controlling,
held that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred.2 s The
Court relied on two major points of Ciraolo: first, the proposition
that a home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from
searches without physical invasion; and second, that the police,
while at a legal vantage point, generally have a right to observe
whatever may be seen. 9 Inferentially, the Court also relied on the
two prong test of Katz to determine that Riley's expectation of
privacy was unreasonable.30 The Court theorized that because
Riley's greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air, Riley could
not have reasonably expected his property to be free from viewing
by aircraft in lawful airspace. 1
Further, the plurality emphasized that the helicopter was not vi-
olating a law or FAA regulation,3 2 and also that there was nothing
to indicate that helicopters at 400 feet are a rarity, thus little sup-
port existed for Riley's claim that he reasonably anticipated his
greenhouse would be free from aerial observation.3 Finally, the
Court concluded that since there was a lack of physical interfer-
ence not only with the use of the home or the curtilage but with
the intimate details associated with the use of the home or curti-
24. Id. at 287. The court reasoned that although the petitioner may not have a reason-
able expectation of privacy from viewing from a fixed wing aircraft in navigable airspace, the
petitioner certainly had a reasonable expectation that his backyard would not be viewed
from a helicopter flying at 500 feet. The court further noted that surveillance by a helicopter
was particularly intrusive in a way that a fixed wing aircraft could not be. Id.
25. Id. at 289.
26. Id.
27. Florida v. Riley, 108 S. Ct. 1011 (1988).
28. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695.
29. Id. at 696.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 697, n.3, (Citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1988)). The Court explained that these
regulations provide, in general, for the minimum safe altitude of fixed wing aircraft of 1,000
feet in congested areas and 500 feet in areas that are not congested. Id.
33. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697.
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lage, no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. 4
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the Court's conclusion, objected
to the emphasis that the majority placed on compliance with FAA
airspace regulations in determining that no Fourth Amendment vi-
olation occurred. 5 O'Connor's analysis of this point involved a dis-
cussion of Ciraolo and its holding that the curtilage is not pro-
tected from aerial observation at 1,000 feet. 6 O'Connor stated that
this holding was not based on the fact that aerial observations at
1,000 feet were legal, but was based upon the fact that air travel at
this altitude 'is so routine that one cannot reasonably expect their
curtilage to be protected from observation. 7 Justice O'Connor ana-
lyzed the differences between helicopter observations and ground
level observations stating that effective precautions can be taken to
block ground level observations while the same may not be true for
air level observations. 8 The Justice relied on Rakas v. Illinois"9 in
support of the contention that the Fourth Amendment does not
require individuals to completely enclose and seal off their curti-
lage from aerial view. 0
O'Connor summarized that, based on Katz, the proper proce-
dure was to determine if helicopter travel by the public at 500 feet
was so routine that Riley could not have had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.' 1 Placing the burden of proof on the defendant
through Nardone v. United States,"2 O'Connor theorized that no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed because there was no rea-
son to believe that flights at 400 feet were nonroutine and Riley
failed to provide evidence to the contrary.4' O'Connor concluded
that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred."
In a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens, the plurality was criticized for
ignoring the reasonable reliance of privacy requirement of Katz
and for placing too much emphasis on compliance with air space
34. Id.
35. Id. at 698. Justice O'Connor emphasized that FAA airspace regulations are to pro-




39. 439 U.S. 128, 152, (1978).
40. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 698.
41. Id.
42. 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).




regulations." The dissent noted that under this theory, no privacy
violation would ever occur as long as one was in a position legally
allowed.46 The dissenters, discussing the majority's use of Ciraolo,
pointed out that the requirement of a legal vantage point is not the
holding of Ciraolo, but rather a passing comment in the case. '7 The
dissenting opinion seized upon the fact that since few private citi-
zens could have access to this legal viewing point, public observa-
tion of Riley's property would not be commonplace, and Riley's
expectation of privacy was therefore reasonable.48
Noting the absence of any minimum flight altitudes for helicop-
ters in the FAA regulations, the dissenters questioned if any con-
ceivable limits could be placed on the plurality's holding. 9 Justice
Brennan observed that the plurality's reference to possible limits
on flights that interfere with one's use of property does not neces-
sarily equate with the Fourth Amendment protection of one's per-
sonal privacy.50 The dissent further pointed out that there is noth-
ing in the plurality's opinion to suggest that this holding is limited
to curtilage observations, and that, therefore, direct observation by
the police into a home from a legal vantage point could now be
allowed. 1
Brennan attacked the plurality's inference that a Fourth
Amendment violation would have occurred had the police inter-
fered with the intimate details of the use of the home.52 Finally,
Brennan accused the Court of wrongly allowing the activity of the
defendant to determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation
had occurred. 3
In summarizing the dissent's position, Justice Brennan first
stated that while he agreed with Justice O'Connor that the basic
issue was whether Riley's expectation of privacy was reasonable
due to the presence of routine public flights, he disagreed with her
45. Id. at 699-705.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 700, n.1.
48. Id. at 700.
49. Id. at 702.
50. Id. The dissent references Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), Mar-
shall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) as supporting the contention that the Fourth Amend-
ment is to safeguard one's personal privacy not to prevent interference with use.





result. 4 Justice Brennan suggested that the Court should take ju-
dicial notice that public flights such as these are a rarity and that,
therefore, Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 In lieu
of this, Justice Brennan determined that the burden of proof on
the issue of flight frequency at 400 feet lies with the state, which
has greater access to information of this type.58 The Justice rea-
soned, therefore, that since the state did not meet this burden, a
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.57 Justice Brennan con-
cluded his dissent with a dramatic illustration that lack of limits
on the plurality's holding could lead to George Orwell's58 depiction
of Big Brother is watching you. 9
Justice Blackmun in a separate dissenting opinion agreed with
Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan that the case turned on the
issue of whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy and
that the issue was to be decided by the frequency of nonpolice
flights.6 0 Justice Blackmun, disagreed, however, with Justice Bren-
nan's suggestion that judicial notice be taken on the issue. 1 Justice
Blackmun relied on his judicial estimate that public flights such as
these are a rarity and placed the burden of proof on the prosecu-
tion to prove otherwise. 2 Justice Blackmun indicated that he
would remand the instant case to give the prosecutor the opportu-
nity to meet the burden, but he, nevertheless, concluded that a
failure to meet this burden would constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation. 3
The historical origin of Fourth Amendment interpretation by
the Supreme Court began when the Court defined the type of
rights the Fourth Amendment protected. In Boyd v United
States6 4 the defendant, an alleged revenue tax defrauder, was or-




58. Id. at 704-705. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOuR 4 (1949).
59. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 705.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Justice Blackmun relies on 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 11.2(b), p. 2 2 8
(2d ed 1987) which reasons that a judicial estimate of probabilities involved may be used to
base burdens of proof in Fourth Amendment cases.
63. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 705.
64. 116 U.S. 616, 618-620, (1886). In Boyd, defendant had been ordered to forfeit 35
cases of plate glass for an alleged violation of the custom revenue laws. Defendant had been
charged with attempting to defraud the government from lawful monies associated with the
35 cases of plate glass. In order for the government to prove their case, it was necessary for
the invoice from a previous shipment to be produced. Under Section 5 of the Act of June 22,
1990
Duquesne Law Review
dered to produce documents associated with a previous order or, in
the alternative, have the alleged charges taken as confessed in ac-
cordance with the custom revenue laws. Defendant argued that the
compulsory production of a person's private papers was an unrea-
sonable search and seizure and thus violated his Fourth Amend-
ment rights.1
5
In order to decide this issue, the Court researched the history
surrounding the writing of the Fourth Amendment .6  After discuss-
ing the framer's opposition to the general warrants of the period,
the Court summarized that,
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasi-
ble right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where
that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,
67
The Court next analyzed the interrelationship between the
Fourth and the Fifth 8 Amendments stating that unreasonable
searches and seizures are almost always made for the purposes of
compelling a man to incriminate himself.6 9 Based on the history of
the amendment and the theorized use of the documents for self
incrimination, the Court concluded that the compulsory produc-
tion of private papers and books violated both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.7 °
The next major area of development in Fourth Amendment law
determined the limits of protection afforded to the area surround-
1874, the government could require the defendant to produce such an invoice and if th
defendant failed to produce said invoice, the charges would be taken as true. 18 Stat. 187.
Id. at 618-620.
65. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 621.
66. Id. at 625. The Court discussed the government of Great Britain's oppressive
method of issuing general warrants to revenue officers to search for smuggled goods in both
her colonies and Great Britain. The Court indicated this was a most oppressive act since
every man's liberty was at stake. Additionally, the Court discussed the popular movement in
Great Britain that displayed a fierce opposition to general warrants issued for the purpose
of searching private houses to find private papers so that libel charges by the government
could be levelled. Id. at 625-626.
67. Id. at 630.
68. U.S. CONST. Amend. V. The fifth amendment states that "No person shall be...
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,..." Id.
69. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
70. Id. at 635. The Court stated that although the case in question was devoid of many
aggravating circumstances of search and seizures, it effected the substantial purpose of the
amendments. The Court finally noted that constitutional provisions should be liberally con-




ing an individual's home. In Hester v. United States71 the Su-
preme Court first enunciated the open field doctrine. In Hester,
federal officers were standing a distance away from the defendant's
house when they observed an alleged wrongdoing. 72 Defendant ar-
gued that the officers could not testify as to what they observed
outside of the house as this evidence was obtained through an ille-
gal search and seizure of his home. 73 The Court in one of it's most
oft-quoted decisions stated that although a trespass did occur, the
Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers and effects
and is not applicable to protection of open fields, areas outside of
defendant's home and curtilage. 4
The open fields doctrine declared by the Supreme Court in Hes-
ter is still the law today.75 However, the open fields doctrine has
been distinguished by the Court from the curtilage concept of
Fourth Amendment protection. Curtilage is defined as the land im-
mediately surrounding and associated with the home. To deter-
mine what constitutes curtilage, an examination of the relationship
between the following factors is performed: the proximity of the
area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is in-
cluded within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of
the uses to which the area is put and the steps taken by the resi-
dent to protect the area from observation by people passing by the
area. 76 The curtilage of one's home may be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection while the open fields surrounding one's
home lack Fourth Amendment protection.77
The Supreme Court's initial standards for determining when
Fourth Amendment protection existed concentrated on the aspect
of a physical invasion or search of a person, house, office or mate-
71. 265 U.S. 57 (1923).
72. Id. at 58. Defendant was accused of violating the prohibition law by distributing
liquor from his house. The officers observed defendant throwing away a bottle outside of his
home. 265 U.S. at 58.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 59. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, stated that this distinction be-
tween open fields and the house is as old as the common law. Id. at 59.
75. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). This open fields doctrine was reaf-
firmed in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver defendant was growing
marijuana on his private farm. The farm was posted with "no trespassing" signs. Police
entered the farm despite the effort by defendant to keep the farm free from trespassers. The
Court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist in the defendant since
these were open fields. The Court explained that there is no societal interest in protecting
the privacy of these areas and that open fields do not provide the setting for intimate activi-
ties the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect. 466 U.S. at 183.
76. U.S. v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987).
77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984).
1990
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rial things.7 8 Olmstead v. United States79 justified this physical in-
vasion or trespass doctrine by implying that the words of the
Amendment itself show that the search is to be of material things.
In Olmstead, evidence against the defendant, who was accused of
violating the National Prohibition Act, was gathered through the
use of a wiretap. 0 The Court, observing that there was no physical
trespass nor seizure of person, paper or tangible effect, concluded
that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated.8
Fourth Amendment law in this particular area did not change
until the landmark case of Katz v. United States" which set to-
day's standard for determining when an unreasonable search and
seizure has occurred. In Katz, the government gathered evidence
by listening to and recording defendant's conversations which oc-
curred behind the closed door of a public telephone booth.8 3 De-
fendant, who was accused of transmitting wagering information,
charged that his right to privacy was violated by the listening de-
vices and that the telephone booth was an area constitutionally
protected from government invasions.8 " The government on the
other hand argued that since no physical invasion occurred, no
Fourth Amendment violation was present under the trespass doc-
trine of Olmstead. 5
The Court declined to address these arguments stating that the
Fourth Amendment is for the protection of people not places.88 It
was further noted that Fourth Amendment protection does not ex-
tend to what a person knowingly exposes to the public.8 7 The
Court explained, however, that in this instance the defendant
sought to exclude the public to his conversation by the closing of
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 460-462 (1927). The Court cites Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.20 (1925) to illustrate the physical
seizure aspect of fourth amendment analysis.
79. 277 U.S. at 464.
80. Id. at 457. The Court noted the taps were made in the basement of an office and in
streets near the house. Id. at 457.
81. Id. at 464. The Court in Goldman v. United States 316 U.S. 129 (1942) and
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), followed this line of reasoning that a physi-
cal trespass or seizure of a tangible item had to occur for a Fourth Amendment violation to
be present.
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. Id. at 348.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 352.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. The Court cited Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and United States
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) in support of these decisions.
336 Vol. 28:327
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the phone booth doors and was thus entitled to believe that his
phone call would not be broadcast to the world.8 8 The Court there-
fore rejected the earlier holdings of Olmstead and its progeny and
stated that Fourth Amendment protection is not dependent on the
presence of a physical intrusion into a given area.8 9 The Court held
that the interception of this private phone conversation was a
search and seizure.
9 0
The Katz Court further noted that although this search and
seizure was confined to the least intrusive manner and the officers
did reasonably expect to find evidence of a particular crime, the
search and seizure did not comply with constitutional standards
that require the showing of probable cause for a warrant to issue,
nor did it fall under the well delineated exceptions to this require-
ment.91 The majority finally summarized by saying that no matter
where a person may be, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.92
In an oft-quoted, concurring opinion, Justice Harlan summarized
the new rule of Fourth Amendment protection as a twofold re-
quirement.93 First, an individual must exhibit an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy, and, second, that expectation must be rec-
ognized as reasonable by society.94 Harlan expounded on his rule
by explaining that objects, activities or statements in the plain
view or in the open, as in Hester, would not be protected because
no expectation of privacy can be shown.9
Harlan's standard is still the benchmark for analysis of Fourth
Amendment cases by today's court.96 In the application of this
standard by the courts, no precise procedure has been set forth to
determine whether a reasonable expectation exists and if the ex-
pectation is justified by society.97 Today's Court has, however, fur-
88. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
89. Id. at 353. The Court decided that the trespass doctrine of these earlier cases was
no longer of constitutional significance. 389 U.S. at 353.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 357. The Court summarized the exceptions to a warrant requirement as cir-
cumstances incident with arrest, circumstances justified on the grounds of hot pursuit by a
law enforcement agent or circumstances indicating the suspects consent. Id. at 357-358.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 361.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 106
S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
97. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-79. The Court states that no single factor determines
1990 337
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ther explained the rule to state that a legitimate expectation of
privacy does not depend on whether the individual chooses to con-
ceal the private activity but depends upon whether the govern-
ment's activities infringe upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment."
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of available Fourth
Amendment protection in cases involving aerial surveillance in
California v. Ciraoloee and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States."'
In Ciraolo, defendant was suspected of growing marijuana in his
yard.101 Police, unable to see in the yard from ground level because
of a six foot fence surrounding defendant's yard, obtained a private
plane and flew over the defendant's house at an altitude of 1,000
feet.102 The police, who at this altitude were able to identify mari-
juana plants growing in the yard with the naked eye, proceeded to
photograph the marijuana.l" A search warrant was obtained and
the marijuana plants were then seized.104 Defendant argued that
the warrantless aerial observation of his yard violated the Fourth
Amendment.
10 5
In applying the first prong of the Katz standard for its analysis,
the Court stated that the defendant had clearly met the test of
manifesting a subjective intent of maintaining privacy with respect
to ground level observations.0 6 The Court next discussed that it
was not clear if defendant had manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy from all vantage points of observation of his back-
yard.107 After noting this discrepancy, the Court abandoned this
prong without clearly deciding on this issue of subjective expecta-
whether a place is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. The Court notes that factors
such as the use of the location, e.g. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the
Framer's original intention, e.g. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and society's
understanding that certain areas deserve high degrees of protection, e.g. Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, (1980), have all been considered in deciding if Fourth Amendment pro-
tection exists. Id. at 178-79.
98. Id. at 181-82. The Court interchanges legitimacy with reasonableness in defining
the standard for Fourth Amend ment protection. Id.
99. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
100. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). Compare California v. Sabo, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987) cert.
denied.
101. 476 U.S. at 209.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 209, 213.
104. Id. at 209-210.
105. Id. at 211.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 211-212. The Court hypothesized that a double decker bus or a police of-
ficer on top of a truck would be able to see over the 10-foot fence. Id at 211.
Vol. 28:327
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tion of privacy from above ground level observations. 10 8
The Court next addressed the second prong of the Katz test by
deciding whether or not the defendant's expectation was reasona-
ble. 109 The Court stated that the defendant's backyard was in his
curtilage, an area where privacy expectations are most height-
ened.110 It was noted, however, that even if the area is within the
curtilage not all police observations would be barred since what is
knowingly exposed to the public is not subject to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.1 The Court additionally commented that an of-
ficer is not required to shield his eyes when passing by a home nor
is an officer restricted from observing at a legal public vantage
point those activities an individual has taken some measures to
conceal. 1 2 The majority enlarged this point by pointing out that
the airplane was in public navigable airspace and that any member
of the public could have observed what the officers viewed.1 3 The
Supreme Court thus held that in an age where flights are routine,
it would be unreasonable for defendant to expect that his yard
would be constitutionally protected from naked eye observations at
1,000 feet. 14
In Dow Chemical the petitioner, Dow Chemical Company, ac-
cused the Environmental Protection Agency of, inter alia, a war-
rantless aerial observation of its chemical plant through the use of
a precision aerial mapping camera at altitudes of greater than
1,200 feet. 1 5 Petitioner had maintained elaborate security around
its complex at ground level, however, due to the cost of covering its
equipment, the aerial view was not covered.11 6 The Fourth Amend-
ment issue in this case was whether the taking of aerial photo-
graphs without a warrant violated petitioner's right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.1 7
In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court first addressed
108. Id. at 212. W. R. LaFave notes that the courts have given little attention to the
first prong of the Katz standard in their interpretation of Fourth Amendment law. LaFave,
Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis In Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. L.R.
291, 297.
109. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
110. Id. at 213.
111. Id. (The court quoted Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.)
112. 476 U.S. at 213.
113. Id. at 213. The Court cites 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976) which states that any citizen
of the United States has a public right of transit through navigable airspace. Id. at 213-214.
114. Id. at 215.
115. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229-230 (1986).
116. Id. at 229.
117. Id. at 233.
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whether petitioner's chemical plant could be considered part of his
curtilage." i The Court noted the differences between the intimate
activity associated with the privacy of a home and its curtilage,
versus the outdoor spaces between the structures and buildings of
a manufacturing plant.11 9 The Court observed that petitioner took
no precautions against this aerial surveillance and pointed out that
no physical entry occurred from the surveillance.120 The Court held
that the open area of an industrial plant complex is not analogous
to the curtilage of a dwelling place for the purpose of aerial surveil-
lance and that such a complex is more comparable to an open
field. 2
The second aspect of Fourth Amendment protection the Court
in Dow investigated was whether use of the aerial mapping camera
was permissible without violating petitioner's rights. 2 2 The Court
first noted that the camera was a common, commercial camera
used in map making. 23 The Supreme Court next stated that these
are not highly sophisticated photos and, therefore, the mere fact
that vision is enhanced does not give rise to constitutional
problems. 124 As a result, it was held that the taking of the aerial
photographs did not violate petitioners Fourth Amendment
rights.12 5
The Supreme Court's analysis in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical of
warrantless aerial surveillance laid the foundation for the analysis
of the case at hand. Florida v. Riley was a warrantless aerial sur-
veillance case, involving naked eye observation of the defendant's
curtilage by a police officer in a helicopter hovering at approxi-
mately 400 feet. 26 At the outset of its opinion, the plurality in
Riley stated that Ciraolo was the controlling case. 12 The Riley
Court then went on to address the issue of curtilage and found
118. Id. at 235.
119. Id. at 236.
120. Id. at 237 n.4.
121. Id. at 239.
122. Id. at 238. The Court stated that Oliver recognized that public and police may
survey from the air lawfully. Id. at 238. However, in Oliver, petitioner and respondent both
agreed on this issue while the Court did not rule on this. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 179.
123. 476 U.S. at 238.
124. Id. The Court noted that technology not available to the general public such as
satellite technology may very well violate ones constitutional rights. Id. at 238.
125. Id. at 239.
126. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
127. Id. at 695.
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that Riley's greenhouse was within the curtilage of his home.12 8 As
in Ciraolo, the Riley Court did not apply the heightened Fourth
Amendment protection usually afforded the curtilage of one's
home, and thus rendered the curtilage doctrine hollow.129 The Su-
preme Court, having found that the greenhouse was within the
curtilage, should have proceeded to hold that the area was entitled
to heightened Fourth Amendment protection which would pre-
clude surveillance of this type and thus the importance of the cur-
tilage doctrine in today's society would have been preserved.
The plurality next addressed the first prong of the Katz stan-
dard: did the defendant have an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy. As in Ciraolo, the Court noted that Riley took precautions
from ground level observations only, thus, implying that Riley only
had a subjective expectation of privacy from ground level observa-
tions, and not from aerial observations.1 0 The Riley Court again
duplicated Ciraolo by bypassing a decision on whether or not Riley
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to air
level observations of his curtilage. The first prong of the Katz stan-
dard was thus passed over by the Court without any meaningful
guidelines to determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation
of privacy from air level observations.
The second prong of the Katz standard, whether the defendant's
expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize as rea-
sonable, was answered in the negative by the plurality. The Riley
Court had no problem drawing the conclusion that Riley could not
have reasonably expected the contents of the greenhouse to be free
from viewing by aircraft in navigable airspace since he did not
have the greenhouse covered from all vantage points.13 1 The Riley
Court's justification of this negative answer was, however, severely
lacking. In its reasoning, the Court did not find it significant that
the police officer's observations were made from a helicopter that
hovered above the defendant's yard rather than from a fixed wing
aircraft like the one that flew over the defendant's yard in
Ciraolo.132 Instead, the Court noted that Ciraolo implied that a
fixed wing aircraft flying at 500 feet would also have been reasona-
ble as 500 feet is within the legal navigable airspace limit for fixed







wing aircraft, 3 ' and commercial flight in public airways is routine
in this country." 4 The Court, in a final effort to justify its conclu-
sion that Riley had no subjective expectation of privacy, went on
to state that there was no indication that such flights are unheard
of in Pasco County, Florida.1 35 This conclusion was apparently de-
rived from facts showing there are more than 10,000 registered
helicopters in the United States, that helicopters have been used in
police work since 1980 with more than 1,500 in use as of 1980, and
finally, there are 31,697 helicopter pilots.136 No suggestion or stan-
dard was offered by the court to show how these facts would make
it unreasonable for an individual in Pasco County, Florida, to
think that his backyard would be free from a helicopter hovering
over it at 400 feet. The Court did not address whether in this par-
ticular locale these types of search flights are commonplace or if
Riley's yard was located in an area that has frequent helicopter
traffic due to standard flight patterns. These factors would be bet-
ter gauges than the number of helicopters and pilots in the United
States for use in the determination of whether an individual in
Pasco County, Florida, could reasonably believe that his yard was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection from overhead low level
flights.
In attempting to justify its holding, the Court further stated that
since the helicopter was operating within the current law, the 400
foot flight elevation is of no significance.137 The Court added that
the police were doing what any member of the public could do and,
thus, this action passed Fourth Amendment muster.
13 8
The Riley plurality's final comment addressed the issue of a
physical invasion or penetration of Riley's property by the helicop-
ter. The Court stated that the helicopter had not interfered with
the use of Riley's property because no undue noise, wind or dust,
or threat of injury was present.1 39 Through this commentary, the
133. Id.
134. Id. (The Court quoted Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 696, n.2. The Court quoted E. Brown, The Helicopter in Civil Operations
70 (1981), Federal Aviation Administration, Census of U.S. Civil Aircraft, Calendar Year
1987, p. 12 and Federal Aviation Administration, Statistical Handbook of Aviation, Calen-
dar Year 1986, p. 147; 1988 Helicopter Annual 9 to illustrate the facts.
137. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696-97. The Court noted that the FAA regulations permit the
operation of helicopters at this level as long as the operation is conducted without hazard to
persons or property. 14 CFR § 91.79 (1988), Riley. 109 S. Ct. at 697 n.3.




plurality appears to take us back to the pre-Katz standard of re-
quiring a physical invasion or trespass before Fourth Amendment
protections exist. The plurality thus purported to apply the two
pronged test of Katz to determine the reasonableness of Riley's
expectation, 4" and in the same breath, disregarded the Katz deter-
mination that Fourth Amendment protections are not dependent
on the presence of a physical intrusion into a given area.'
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion stated that the standard
in Ciraolo was controlling. 42 Like Ciraolo, curtilage protection of
one's backyard was discussed and subsequently disregarded by the
Justice with the statement that all police observation of the curti-
lage is not necessarily barred by the Fourth Amendment.
4 3
The first prong of Katz, the exhibition of a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, was also omitted in the concurring opinion, thus,
leaving no standard for determining what would constitute a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in aerial surveillance cases. The sec-
ond prong, the reasonableness requirement, was discussed in sev-
eral aspects and utilized to reach a decision. Justice O'Connor
noted that reasonableness requires that an individual take precau-
tions against public observation.44 Noting that an individual con-
ceivably could not block off all aspects of aerial surveillance, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that compliance with FAA regulations in all
instances would not guarantee that an individual lacked a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. 45 The Justice abandoned the implica-
tion of this statement and summarized that the second prong, the
reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, is determined by
the regularity of public air travel at these altitudes and not based
upon the regularity of police air travel at the same altitudes. 4"
Justice O'Connor placed the burden of proof in establishing regu-
larity of flights on the defendant.' 47 Noting the lack of evidence
introduced by Riley concerning regularity of public flights and
stating, without any detailed support, that there is reason to be-
lieve there is considerable public use of airspace at these altitudes,
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority and held that
140. Id.
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
142. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 697.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 698.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 699.
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Riley's expectation of privacy was unreasonable." 8
Justice Brennan's dissent applied the Katz two prong standard
but did not discuss the curtilage doctrine and its application to the
facts at hand. Justice Brennan's dissent began by severely criticiz-
ing the plurality's purported application of the Katz standards.
The dissent, basing its resolution of the aerial surveillance issue on
the second prong of the Katz test, also failed to address the first
prong requirement of the exhibition of a subjective expectation of
privacy by the defendant. The dissenting opinion agreed with Jus-
tice O'Connor by stating that under Katz the question to be an-
swered is whether public observation of Riley's curtilage was so
commonplace that Riley's expectation of privacy could not be con-
sidered reasonable. 9 Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's solution to this question being based upon her having
reason to believe that there are considerable flights of this na-
ture. 5 ' The dissent proposed that judicial notice be taken that
flights over populated areas at these altitudes are a rarity in loca-
tions like Riley's and thus Riley's expectation would be reasona-
ble. 51 Justice Brennan also disagreed with placing the burden of
proof, with respect to regularity of flights, on the defendant as Jus-
tice O'Connor did.156 Justice Brennan stated that the State has
greater access to this information and that the burden should fall
on them. 53 Since the state failed to meet this burden, Riley's ex-
pectation would thus be assumed to be reasonable. 54
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justices
O'Connor and Brennan that the question to be answered was
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. 55 This analy-
sis, which also excluded the application of the curtilage doctrine
and the answering of the first prong of the Katz test, proceeded
directly to the second prong of the Katz test. In applying this sec-
ond prong, Justice Blackmun agreed that the determination of rea-
sonableness should be based on frequency of flights and not on the
fact that the helicopter was at a lawful altitude.156 Justice Black-
mun rejected Justice Brennan's solution to this question of taking
148. Id.
149. Id. at 701.









judicial notice on the frequency of such flights and instead pro-
posed that the burden of proof with respect to such flights be
placed on the prosecution, since, in his estimation, such flights are
not frequent.'57 Justice Blackmun noted that a Fourth Amend-
ment violation occurred since this burden was not met by the pros-
ecution but recommended remanding the case to allow the prose-
cution a chance to meet this burden.158
It appears that the standards used by today's Supreme Court in
evaluating Fourth Amendment rights under the Katz reasonable
expectation test in aerial surveillance cases are unclear yet the re-
sults are predictable. The Court will discuss such principles as a
heightened expectation of privacy in one's curtilage but places lit-
tle significance there in its final analysis. The Court also purports
to be using the Katz two pronged test for Fourth Amendment pro-
tection, but has resisted answering the first prong concerning what
is necessary for a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to
surveillance of one's property from the air."5 9 Since the Court
glided over the first prong, it may be reasonable to infer from the
Riley case that no extra precautions are needed in order to exhibit
a subjective expectation of privacy from air level observations as
compared to ground level observations. In answering the second
prong, the Court has not set forth any consistent criterion for de-
termining what is reasonable. Additionally, the dicta in Riley indi-
cates that the Court may be moving towards the trespass doctrine
of the pre-Katz era.
The Supreme Court needs to confirm how much effort is neces-
sary for an individual to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy
with respect to aerial surveillance. This effort should not be unob-
tainable by the ordinary, reasonable person. In other words, an in-
dividual should not, under ordinary circumstances, be required to
completely cover his backyard in order to have a subjective expec-
tation of privacy with respect to overhead flights. To decide other-
wise would make Fourth Amendment protection in aerial surveil-
lance cases involving curtilage meaningless to the average
individual.
The Supreme Court finally needs to set forth standards for eval-
uating reasonableness. Courts have had no problem deciding what
an ordinary, reasonable person would expect in other situations.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 109.
1990
Duquesne Law Review
The Court in the area of Fourth Amendment protection should
also have no problem in determining what subjective expectations
society would think of as reasonable in aerial surveillance cases.
Reasonableness could depend on factors such as the location of the
individual with respect to airports or the length or duration of the
flight over the individual's property.
It is probably true that most individuals today realize that pub-
lic flights occur overhead, but it is also probably true that most
individuals do not expect these public flights to spy in depth on
their activities in their backyards. Most individuals would proba-
bly realize that with today's aircraft and technology, aerial surveil-
lance could happen, but most individuals, if questioned about this,
would probably think that it would not happen. The Court in
Riley should have been willing to consider and place weight on the
expectation of ordinary individuals in society as to the sanctity of
their homes and yards from aerial observation by police by laying
down a clear standard for such a determination. The Court failed
to do this. As a result, the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
in aerial observation cases appears to be limited and unclear at
best.
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